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Abstract 
We examine the role of political economy drivers of the choice agenda in European health systems 
including middle class electoral support. Building on the reform trajectories and current 
institutional framework in eight western European countries where there have been significant 
choice reforms, we explore the preferences for choice and health system satisfaction in those 
countries. We find provider choice to be supported by middle class demands and health systems 
satisfaction, but weak evidence of other alternative political motivations for the expansion of 
provider choice. We conclude that in addition to efficiency improvements, provider choice is 
largely correlated with the demands for choice among the middle class. The provider choice 
agenda responds as much to political economy consideration as it does to efficiency arguments.   
 
 
Keywords: provider choice, health system satisfaction, tax funded health systems, middle 
class demands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 * European Institute and Department of Social Policy, London School of                   
    Economics and Political Science   
    Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE 
    Email: j.costa-font@lse.ac.uk  
** Department of Social Policy, London School of Economics and Political  
    Science 
    Email: v.zigante@lse.ac.uk   
 
The Choice Agenda in European Health Systems 
  
 
Table of Contents  
 
Abstract 
1. Introduction 1 
2.1 Efficiency as a driver 6 
2.2 Provider interests and modernisation 9 
2.3 The middle class and choice reform 11 
3. Methodology and data 13 
3.1 Case selection 13 
3.2 Empirical model and assumptions 15 
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics 18 
4. Results 21 
5. Discussion 27 
6. Conclusion 30 
References 31 
Joan Costa-i-Font and Valentina Zigante 
 
    
 
1 
‘The Choice Agenda’ in European Health 
Systems: The Role of ‘Middle Class Demands’ 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A key tenet of European health and consumer protection strategy lies in 
strengthening patient involvement in decision making (European Union 
2006). A dominant reform consistent with that goal is that of furthering 
provider choice, which does not always encompass widening financing 
choice, often referred to as the ‘choice agenda’. Provider choice refers to an 
expansive policy reform which furthers the choice set of certain aspects of 
care, such as decisions regarding inpatient and outpatient care. However, for 
a patient to benefit from choice, health systems need to widen their service 
diversity, which from a provider perspective entails the introduction of some 
level of competition in the organization of public services. A textbook 
explanation for the benefits of such reform would go as follows: the 
empowerment of potential choices rewards provider performance which 
incentivises a more efficient production and improved quality (Kreisz and 
Gericke 2010). Based on such rationale, provider choice can promise efficiency 
driven re-organisation of the care provision sector. Conversely, authors argue 
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that the increased reliance on ‘provider choice’ has led to the progression of 
‘consumerism’ governing the relation between patients and the health care 
service, for example in the UK (Newman and Kuhlman 2007). 
 
Nonetheless, in addition to ‘consumerism’ critiques, which mainly highlight a 
shift in the motivation of agents rather than on the outcomes, there are 
reasons to argue that ‘choice reforms’ are not automatically predicted to entail 
efficiency gains1. We are referring to political economy arguments, and more 
specifically the role of provider choice in reducing the potential for provider 
capture of health care regulators, and reducing physicians’ overwhelming 
power within the health system. In addition, provider choice offers an 
alternative course of action for public sector involvement in health care to 
bypass traditional interclass agreements guided primarily by insurance 
motivations, and more generally to modernise the health system. Finally, the 
middle class hypothesis has been particularly articulated in regards in 
relation to the case of the English NHS, provider choice extends he possibility 
to choose to all social groups (Milburn 2002). 
 
We argue in this paper that political economy explanations are important 
drivers of the choice agenda. We examine a range of hypothesised drivers of 
                                                        
1 Possible limits to choice worth noting are imperfect information sharing and increasing 
complexity as well as potential bottlenecks in the short run.  
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the choice agenda in health systems, beyond the simple economic ‘cost-
containment’ and efficiency argument. The drivers are examined in relation to 
European health care system trajectories, specifically to the distinctive reform 
patterns of tax funded National Health Service (NHS) compared to Social 
Health Insurance (SHI) systems. Not surprisingly, the ‘choice agenda’ is 
especially prominent in NHS type health care systems where choice has 
traditionally been limited. The empirical analysis hones in on a particularly 
prominent explanation – the middle class as a driver of choice reform. This 
departs from a well-established body of literature about the demands of the 
middle-class driving the public policy agenda dating back to Goodin and Le 
Grand (1987). Similarly, in the sociological literature the middle class is 
argued to be particularly prone to desire choice and in its quest to culturally 
distinguish itself from ‘others’ and maintain cultural belonging (Bourdieu 
2008).  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows; the next section provides 
a background to, and discusses evidence on, the drivers of choice in European 
health care systems. Next methods and descriptive data are outlined, 
followed by results of the empirical analysis in section four. Section five 
provides a discussion of the evidence provided and implications for theory 
and policy while section six concludes.  
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2. Drivers of the European ‘choice agenda’ 
 
An extensive literature offers views on the goals and drivers of choice and 
competition. This section discusses the range of suggested drivers and the 
previous evidence supporting their applicability in European health care 
systems.  
 
Firstly, in order to understand the anticipated effects of the ‘choice agenda’, it 
is crucial to clarify the dynamics of the introduction of provider choice and 
how it changes health care incentives. Key features are who makes the choice 
and what body is allowed to compete. The two questions allow us to 
distinguish between mixed markets and public competition; if purchasing 
choices are made by public agents (mediating between patients and 
providers) we have mixed markets, whilst if only choices are made by 
patients amongst competing public and private providers there is 
competition. Thus, the purchaser-provider split is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for managed competition, given that the mechanisms to 
create a market as well as a managerial strategy allowing the public and 
private providers to compete are absent. Freeman (1998) explores the political 
drivers of competition in European countries, and we here take a different 
stance as our key focus is on choice, in conjunction with competition. 
Joan Costa-i-Font and Valentina Zigante 
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However, we believe it is neither possible nor desirable to completely 
disconnect the drivers of choice reform from those of competition reform.   
  
A wide range of stirring factors for the rise of the choice and competition 
agenda in public services can be discerned from the wider policy debate. On 
one extreme, some literature coherently promotes choice as either intrinsically 
(Dowding and John 2009) as well as instrumentally valuable (Le Grand 2007), 
which rationalises the variance within the political spectrum from traditional 
to paternalist libertarianism. Nonetheless, the introduction of choice, as an 
institutional reform, can be the outcome of a political demand. That is, the 
result of some form of a conveniently adapted policy transfers from other 
countries experiences (policy spill-over). Contextual triggers, such as 
globalization and European integration, might have laid the foundations for 
the diffusion of reforms, even when its re-interpretation (adoption and 
adaptation) is specific to each national and organizational context. Setting 
aside the heterogeneity of policy culture and language, some frontrunner 
countries (e.g., the United Kingdom) tend to act as blueprints for countries 
where there are strong and widespread aspirations to ‘catch up with the rest 
of Europe’, such as in Southern and Eastern Europe (Cabiedes and Guilleen 
2001) which is often referred to as ‘institutional arbitrage’.   
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2.1 Efficiency as a driver 
In its core principles, the choice agenda impinges on citizen empowerment as 
fictitious market consumers. However, unlike in a free market, provider 
choice and competition in health systems enacts a set of more complex 
mechanisms. General taxation provides funding can be thought of as an 
implicit (public) price, yet unlike in a market system, its returns are complex 
establish. In particular, consumers’ capacity for judging health care quality 
tends to be poor (Marshall et al. 2000). Indeed, US patients were found  not to 
use information on quality of care to switch from hospitals with poor quality 
to those with high quality (Fung et al 2008). This implies that the efficiency 
improvements are unlikely to be rewarded following a market rationale. This 
does however not imply that choice fails completely to exert an incentive 
structure parallel to that of markets, or simply as a driver for reform, but 
rather that the incentives operate through more complex mechanisms 
(Newman and Kuhlmann 2007) which expand to the political arena as we 
argue in this paper.  
 
That said, a stream of studies on the English NHS are currently providing 
growing evidence in favour of efficiency improvements following choice and 
competition in health care ( Propper et al, 2008; Gaynor et al, 2010; Cooper et 
al. 2011) and evidence from Swedish hospitals suggests improvements in 
Joan Costa-i-Font and Valentina Zigante 
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technical efficiency following choice and competition (Gerdtham et al. 1999). 
Hence, there is evidence of micro-efficiency resulting from provider choice. 
Nonetheless, surprisingly there is scant evidence that choice alone contains 
costs resulting from an  injection of ‘market-like’ incentives into the health 
care sector (Le Grand 2007). For example, the problems of implementing 
policies of provider choice in the English NHS has been discussed by Le 
Grand et al (1998) and Brereton and Vasoodaven (2010). This means that there 
are limits as to whether choice (and competition) as a means to cut 
expenditure can be an effective policy. Furthermore, even if “policy makers 
have an efficiency impulse to offer larger numbers of choices” (Frank and 
Lamiraud 2009: 550) it is clear that there are efficiency problems with 
extensive availability of options. The latter explains why some policies have 
restricted provider choice, such as in Germany and France (Or et al, 2012). 
 
One explanation lies in that cost-containment pressures vary between 
countries although a role played is argued to be in response to EU pressure 
(Steffen 2010). In contrast cost-containment as a motivation for reform in NHS 
style countries is, albeit present, less of a pressing issue. Denoting for the NHS 
style countries is emphasis on choice rather than competition. For instance in 
the UK, reforms have included choice of GP and more recently choice of 
hospital for elective surgery accompanied by waves of internal market 
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competition (Department of Health 2003). Further, Sweden has a truly 
decentralised financing and provision structure, argued to be conducive to 
cost-containment where municipalities are in charge of channelling local taxes 
to health care (Fotaki 2007). Also in Italy (Anell 2005) and Spain, health care is 
devolved, but soft budget constrains remain which has stimulated 
experimentation but not cost-containment (Durán et al. 2006, Costa-Font 2012 
and Costa-Font and Pons-Novell 2007). In both countries certain regions have 
experimented with competition; the Italian Lombardy region (1997 health care 
reform), aiming to improve quality of health care services and reduce costs 
though competition between public and private hospitals, and the Spanish 
region state of Catalonia where traditionally the majority of providers are 
private, a purchaser provider split quasi market model with some level of 
competition has been introduced (López-Casasnovas et al. 2006, López-
Casasnovas et al, 2005).  
 
Altogether, there is some evidence that there seems to be more to the ‘choice 
(and competition) agenda’ than cost-containment and efficiency, especially in 
tax funded health systems. The following subsections discuss the other 
hypothesised complementary drivers in terms of the present institutional 
evidence from secondary sources.  
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2.2 Provider interests and modernisation 
Following Hacker (2005), the choice agenda can argued to result in provider 
capture to increase their rents at the expense of the rest of the health system. 
There is a lot to gain from involvement in the health care sector, for a variety 
of private actors; local health care providers as well as the international 
pharmaceutical and insurance industry. This argument is consistent with 
evidence would be consistent with increasing use role for private providers in 
choice reforms (Evans 1997). However, provider choice often does not 
necessarily involve a drastic expansion of private providers, instead might 
result in the strengthening of more efficiency run public providers.   
 
Evidence suggests that the role of private options varies considerably between 
the countries of our sample and is intertwined with auxiliary sectors such as 
the pharmaceutical industry. Sweden and Belgium are the only countries 
showing a steady increase in private expenditure, whereas most other 
countries of our sample show varying patterns of periods of contraction and 
expansion of private expenditure (OECD 2010). In Spain, Spanish region 
states such as Catalonia where the majority of providers are privately run 
have traditionally followed a purchaser provider split quasi market model 
with some level of competition but does not apply across the country (López 
et al. 2006). Similarly, in Italy, it is mainly the Lombardy region that promotes 
The Choice Agenda in European Health Systems 
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competition between public and private hospitals. The effects have resulted in 
some quality improvements and in turn the attraction of patients from other 
regions (France and Taroni 2005; France et al. 2005). Hence, although one 
could expect provider choice to give rise to some provider capture, the 
evidence does not point to shift in that direction.  
 
Several countries have moved towards choice and competition reforms 
following a reaction to shortcomings in the health care system. Examples of 
shortcomings include excessive waiting times, lack of patient centeredness 
and overly bureaucratic procedures. Firstly, in Sweden concerns of cubing 
growing waiting times gave rise to efficiency enhancing policies, however 
without increasing the reliance on private options (Burström 2009). Similarly 
in the UK, the NHS has been subject to criticism for poorly addressing 
demands of access improvements which fed into the sequence of choice 
reforms; from initial choice policies in the late 1980s under Conservative 
governments, later followed by Labour’s ‘third way’ policies which again 
expanded choice and competition (Greener 2003). In both Sweden and the UK 
the emphasis on public provision was maintained. On the other hand, Italy’s 
scattered approach to choice and competition (mainly present in the northern 
region of Lombardy) does not point towards modernisation pressures as 
drivers of reform either (France and Taroni 2005). 
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2.3 The middle class and choice reform  
A central driver of reform, as argued before is that of middle class capture. 
Blomqvist (2004) argues, in the case of Sweden, that the middle class is 
disproportionally benefiting from the choice agenda, and hence lending to a 
platform of support to the political elites that take such a proposal into a 
political manifesto. The middle class is argued to have a distinct preference 
for consumer choice (Fotaki 2009) and this influential group demands a 
special service and has a tendency to exit the public system if quality becomes 
an issue (Costa-Font and Jofre-Bonet 2008). The paper is based on the 
theoretical arguments in favour of the middle class as a key constituency for 
welfare reform (Goodin and Le Grand 1987; Loayza et al. 2012, Esping-
Andersen 1990). The middle class is argued to benefit substantially from 
universally provided services and benefits, at times even more so than other 
social groups, due to their ability to manoeuvre the system as a result of their 
generally higher levels of education and societal standing (e.g. connections) 
(Goodin and Le Grand 1987). The later explains that pro-choice countries 
groups with higher education (and income) have easier access to specialist 
healthcare. Korpi and Palme (2003) forward an argument to revive the role of 
class when explaining the welfare state in response to Pierson’s new politics 
of the welfare state (Pierson 2001). Together with potential provider capture, 
the middle class, can be pinpointed to create the condition for increased 
The Choice Agenda in European Health Systems 
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choice within the public sector as a means to enforcing the allegiance with the 
welfare state (Goodin and Le Grand 1987). The risk of maintaining a rigid and 
traditional health system is that the middle class, can opt out downgrading 
public health care to a ‘second class’ service  and reducing satisfaction with 
the health system (Costa-Font and Jofre-Bonet, 2008). 
 
Finally, we note that the ‘middle class’ is not easily defined, particularly in the 
setting of an international comparison. The literature offers conflicting 
approaches; for example Korpi and Palme see class as defined through 
“membership groups with which individuals identify and the specific 
subcultures and norms of such groups” (2003: 427). A similar classic approach 
defines class as categories of individuals who share relatively similar 
positions or situations in for example employment relations (Goldthorpe 
2000). Further, the ability of the middle class to make ‘better choices’ and 
hence benefit disproportionally, depends on several factors. The economics 
literature highlights education and income which enable individuals to make 
more informed and costly choices (Dixon et al. 2003). The sociological 
literature meanwhile focuses on theories of social capital, claiming that 
individuals are socialised into certain habits which are then enforced though 
learning from the social group that the individuals belongs to. Individuals in 
similar social groups assimilate into behaving in a certain way; in this context, 
to make active and ‘good’ choices (Bourdieu 2008).  
Joan Costa-i-Font and Valentina Zigante 
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3. Methodology and data 
The middle class preference hypothesis is empirically analysed using the 
World Health Survey (2002) and the Eurobarometer 72.2 (2009) in which a 
rich set of variables of individuals’ perceptions of the health care system, 
demand for choice, demographic variables and satisfaction variables, across 
the countries of our sample are available. This section discusses the case 
selection, data and empirical models.  
 
3.1 Case selection  
This paper uses survey data from eight European countries where there is 
evidence of choice reforms, consisting of a sample of NHS (tax funded) and 
SHI type health care systems for comparison. Given that path dependency 
and the various reform trajectories play a crucial role in defining policy 
options we focus on the trajectories of five tax funded systems where there 
have been some choice reforms. That said, one must acknowledge that there 
are different degrees of provider choice.  Firstly, in our NHS system countries 
(England, Sweden, Italy and Spain) provider choice is a more recent addition, 
and services have generally been highly integrated and only in Italy and 
Spain we observe that regional organisation of the health system has have 
opened the door to provider choice in some regions only. We compare tax 
The Choice Agenda in European Health Systems 
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funded countries to a sample of SHI system countries (Belgium, France, 
Germany and The Netherlands) that hold a long tradition of choice on the 
provision side, and in recent years, experimentation with some level of choice 
on the financing side, namely choice of insurance provider. Overall we find a 
gap between countries where ‘choice’ is embedded in the institutional setting 
of the health system and those where choice is a late addition through various 
reforms.  
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the institutional features in the eight 
countries. The table shows dimensions of financing, provision and reliance on 
competition, factors which constrain or facilitate reform. The eight countries 
differ in the size of the health system, the extent of patient cost sharing, 
funding and territorial organisation, as well as the extent of public 
intervention. This reflects their broad representation of health care systems in 
Europe.  
 
In the sample of SHI countries as expected we find they spend more as a 
proportion of GDP on health, tend to have a lower public expenditure and a 
higher satisfaction with the health care system (data from European Quality 
of Life Survey). Out-of-pocket payments and the role for private insurance 
varies significantly between the countries, with a higher (yet variable) 
prevalence of private insurance in SHI countries. The average satisfaction 
Joan Costa-i-Font and Valentina Zigante 
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mirrors spending to a certain extent, but it is clear that other variables 
influence. Co-payments (or out-of-pocket payments) tend to be driven by 
spending on pharmaceuticals, dentistry and physiotherapy and reflect strives 
to counter rising expenditure.  
 
Table 1: Institutional features influencing choice and competition in eight 
European health care systems (2008) 
  Expenditure 
Financing 
structure 
General 
government 
expenditure 
Private 
expenditure 
Public 
expenditure 
Co- 
payments 
 
% of GDP Funding % of total expenditure on health  
Belgium 11.1 Sickness funds 10.5 25.3 66.8 20.5 
France 11.2 Sickness funds 5.2 22.2 77.8 7.4 
Germany 10.5 Sickness funds 8.8 23.2 76.8 13 
Italy 9.1 Centralised 77.1 22.8 77.2 19.5 
The 
Netherlands 9.9 Sickness funds 5.1 16.5 75.3 5.7 
Spain 9 Centralised 67.7 27.5 72.5 20.7 
Sweden 9.4 Decentralised 81.9 18.1 81.9 15.6 
UK 8.7 Centralised 82.6 17.4 82.6 11.1 
 
Source: OECD Health Data 2010 Version: October 2010. Data from 2008  
Notes: Private expenditure includes out-of-pocket payments, private insurance programmes, 
charities and occupational health care. General government expenditure is incurred by central, 
state/regional and local government authorities, excluding social security schemes, including are 
non-market, non-profit institutions that are controlled and mainly financed by government units. 
Co-payments comprise cost-sharing, self-medication and other expenditure paid directly by 
private households including co-payment or co-insurance or deductibles. Public expenditure 
includes expenditure incurred by state, regional and local government and social security 
schemes.  
 
 
3.2 Empirical model and assumptions 
The empirical strategy takes advantage of within and between cross country 
variability. We firstly consider the relation between availability of choice and 
individual satisfaction with the health system and secondly the individuals’ 
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demand for choice relative to other health care system features. Individuals’ 
satisfaction with the health care system in the country of residence is a 
common indicator for the responsiveness of the system (Coulter and 
Jenkinson 2005) and can be seen as a proxy for the legitimacy of the health 
care system as a public service (Bergman 2002). Choice has previously been 
identified as improving overall wellbeing under most conditions (Iyengar 
2010) and specifically in the case of choice of hospital in England (Zigante 
2011). The latter found that groups with lower income and lower education 
that state a higher demand for choice. An overall significant relation between 
choice and satisfaction is a necessary condition for the validity of the ensuing 
regression modelling of middle class demand for choice. Even though choice 
is not particularly high on the list of health system characteristics, we 
hypothesise that it is a key contributor to overall health system satisfaction. In 
sum, given a positive relation between choice and satisfaction, if there is a 
middle class gradient to choice preferences we should see this in NHS 
countries, where choice has traditionally been limited and has been promoted 
as part of a ‘choice agenda’ over the past 20 years, but not in SHI countries.   
 
The empirical modelling approach relies on a set of assumptions. Firstly, a 
key assumption is that individuals’ perception of choice has a correspondence 
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to the actual prevalence of choice2, for each of the countries of our sample and 
is not significantly biased between social groups. It is not clear from the 
literature what extent the availability of choice is reflected in the perceptions 
of users, for example in the UK surveys have found that around half of the 
patients recall being offered a choice of hospital (Dixon, 2008).  
 
In order to account for the categorical nature of the dependent variables we 
model the relationships using logistic models with binary or ordinal 
dependent variables (Agresti 2012). The logit regressions assume a latent 
variable y* which is linearly related to the observed independent variables 
         where    is a vector of observed covariates and    is a random 
disturbance independent of the observed covariates. The observed dependent 
variable y equals 1 only if an unobserved variable y* is greater than an 
unobserved threshold,  .  
That is,    
      
   
       
    
     
The regression analysis of both datasets included a set of standard 
demographic covariates: age, gender, marital status, health variables (need, 
previous usage), employment, education and proxies for income.  
                                                        
2 The latter can be problematic when respondents seem to “perceive” much choice in a system 
where in fact there is hardly any choice at all; this could be related to the fact that some countries 
changed from strict gatekeeping to a situation where patients can choose their doctor. Hence, we 
do acknowledge that this ai an imperfect measure of choice.  
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3.3 Data and descriptive statistics  
We use two survey data sources which allow us to identify individuals’ views 
on choice in the health care system. Firstly, the World Health Survey (WHS) 
data identifies structural difference in how choice is perceived between 
countries (2002). Table 2 illustrates the pattern of perceived freedom to choose 
health care providers in general and hospitals more specifically in the 
countries. There is a substantial variation in the rating of the availability of 
choice between the countries, and the variation matches well the extent to 
which choice is prominent within the health care systems of the respective 
countries, with Belgium in the top for both general choice and choice of 
hospital. The perceived choice of health care provider, as opposed to hospital, 
includes primary care, which is where the most extensive choice is available. 
The higher ratings of choice of other care providers compared to choice of 
hospital stems from the more specialised nature of hospital care which 
implies a higher technological and knowledge based constraint on individual 
choice. The average satisfaction with the national health care system and the 
rating of the freedom to choose provider are weakly yet positively correlated3.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 Satisfaction of the health care system is treated as a proxy for quality, which does not change 
the results when not included in the specification.   
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Table 2: Mean rating of freedom to choose, by country 
 
Choice of 
hospital SE 
Choice of 
provider SE 
 
Satisfaction with 
health care 
system SE 
Belgium 4.195 0.04 4.514 0.048 4.304 0.027 
France 3.904 0.035 4.468 0.068 4.104 0.029 
Germany 3.294 0.039 4.229 0.063 3.595 0.032 
Italy 3.608 0.04 3.808 0.071 3.849 0.036 
Netherlands 3.784 0.027 3.931 0.052 3.196 0.031 
Spain 3.231 0.018 3.546 0.024 3.554 0.012 
Sweden 3.268 0.079 3.622 0.076 3.811 0.036 
UK 3.75 0.053 4.037 0.059 3.882 0.034 
Source: Authors calculation based on estimates from rating of survey questions of the World 
health survey (2002)  
 
Second, the Eurobarometer 72.2, (2009) offers data on preferences regarding 
the health care system. Along with a range of socioeconomic indicators, the 
Eurobarometer survey asks individuals what they consider to be the most 
important criteria for quality health care (see table 3). Respondents are asked 
to choose three out of the eleven criteria (there is also an ‘other’ category).4  
 
The most commonly mentioned characteristics across the countries are ‘well-
trained staff’, ‘effective treatment’ and ‘no waiting lists’ (mentioned by up to 
65% of respondents). These are closely linked to the ultimate outcome of an 
interaction with the health system – an improved or restored health status 
and are known to be components which individuals see as important or 
                                                        
4 Of the following criteria, which are the three most important criteria when you think of high 
quality healthcare in your country? Proximity of hospital and doctor, Free choice of doctor, 
Respect of a patient’s dignity, Medical staff that is well trained, A clean environment at the 
healthcare facility, Treatment that works, Free choice of hospital, Healthcare that keeps you safe 
from harm, No waiting lists to get seen and treated, A welcoming and friendly environment, 
Modern medical equipment. Respondent may select up to three answers.  
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indeed necessary for a positive health outcome (Johannesson et al. 1998; 
Dawson et al. 2007).  
Table 3: Percentage mentioning criteria for a quality health system, by country in 2009 
 
France Germany Italy Netherlands Belgium Spain Sweden UK Total 
Proximity 40.81 15.22 11.83 21.37 20.99 28.39 56.02 13.76 25.29 
Dignity 24.58 27.46 15.87 21.37 33.89 23.01 14.63 12.42 21.97 
Choice of 
doctor 
23.6 25.11 36.73 32.21 27.29 22.81 27.56 21.17 26.95 
Well-
trained 
staff 
47 62.65 43.17 63.42 50.94 54.28 65.77 59.87 56.25 
Clean 19.27 22.19 19.9 12.92 13 11.85 10.65 29.84 17.8 
Effective 
treatment 
34.71 39.62 36.25 39.36 32.91 28.39 35.32 40.04 36.07 
Choice of 
hospital 
20.26 14.25 12.5 14.81 26.11 10.36 8.26 14.05 15.03 
Safety 
from 
harm 
15.14 34.55 22.88 22.76 17.34 18.23 4.48 29.16 21.46 
No 
waiting 
lists 
21.53 13.79 33.37 37.87 19.01 46.31 39.3 27.43 28.82 
Friendly 
staff 
8.06 1.89 10 4.47 11.13 3.98 4.78 6.64 6.12 
Modern 
equipmen
t 
30.29 31.69 21.83 16 26.4 20.32 24.38 23.39 24.74 
Other 0.1 0.46 0.58 0.99 0.89 1.99 0.6 0.1 0.69 
Don't 
know 
0.39 0.2 1.35 0.7 0.39 0.6 0.2 2.98 0.82 
Source: Eurobarometer 72.2 2009 Estimates  are percentage rating varying from 0-100. 
 
 
Choice of doctor or hospital is mentioned by on average 20% of respondents. 
Interestingly, hospital choice is most frequently mentioned in SHI countries, 
where choice should be available to most patients. The mentioning of choice 
of doctor varies across the country clusters, most common in Italy and least in 
the UK. Finally, in order to identify the middle class a range of social status 
indicators are used. Primarily, a self-rated social status (‘1’ lowest and 10 
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‘highest’) variable is used. Since national conceptions of social class are 
relative within each society, a self-rated variable means there is no need to 
equivalise the scale to account for cross-country differences (Banerjee and 
Duflo 2008). The ordinal self-rated social status variable (ranging from 1 to 10) 
is entered into the regressions both as a z-score transformed variable and as 
individual dummies for each of the categories. 
 
4. Results   
 
Firstly, we have examined the determinants of the individual’s rating of 
choice on the overall satisfaction using the WHS dataset to understand 
whether choice is a valued dimension in rating a health system. The 
specification includes a set of measures that proxy socio-economic status and 
other socio-demographic characteristics. Country dummies are added to the 
standard set of covariates and in this we aim to isolate the effect of the level of 
available choice on satisfaction with the health care system as reported in 
Table 4.  
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Table 4: Ordered Probit Regression Analysis of legitimacy of health care systems 
 
 Basic Health variables  NHS SHI 
Freedom to 
choose  
health care 
provider 
 Very Bad (1) (ref cat)       
 Bad  2.013*** 2.064*** 2.005*** 7.993* 
 Moderate  3.014*** 2.990*** 3.051*** 4.679 
 
 Good  4.113*** 4.149*** 4.299*** 6.893** 
   Very good  (5) 6.143*** 6.028*** 6.348*** 9.167** 
Household 
expenditure 
(quartile) 
1st (ref cat)         
2nd  1.077 1.017 1.068** 0.951 
3rd 0.939 0.889 0.989 0.627* 
  4th  0.830 0.777*** 0.829** 0.732** 
Health status  Very Bad (1) (ref cat)       
 
 Bad  0.815 0.767* 0.769 
 
 
 Moderate  1.041 0.968 1.028 0.780 
 
 Good  1.422*** 1.313 1.352 1.391 
 
 Very good  (5) 2.109*** 1.936 2.012* 1.846 
Sex Male (ref cat) 
      Female 1.018 1.027 1.009 1.088 
Age 1.019*** 1.018*** 1.022*** 1.003 
 Years in formal education 0.976*** 0.978*** 0.976*** 1.012 
Current job Government employee (ref cat)       
 
Non-government 
employee 0.897* 0.859*** 0.920 0.778*** 
 
Self-employed 0.828 0.798 0.917 0.500* 
 
Employer 0.676* 0.737 0.567*** 1.657 
 
Not working for pay 1.043 1.033 1.119*** 0.803** 
Marital status Never married (ref cat)       
Currently married  0.892* 0.890** 0.882** 1.090 
 
Separated  1.074 1.091 1.054 3.015 
 
Divorced  0.750* 0.730* 0.945 0.656** 
 
Widowed  0.871*** 0.887* 0.925 0.756 
  Chohabiting   0.860 0.858 0.720 1.102 
Country Belgium 5.344*** 9.682***   3.614*** 
 
France 5.319*** 5.019*** 
 
1.462*** 
 
Germany 1.507*** 1.416*** 
 
0.747*** 
 
Italy 0.990 1.018 1.061*** 
 
 
Netherlands 2.597*** 2.522*** 
  
 
Sweden 2.526*** 2.647*** 2.764*** 
 
 
UK 3.191*** 3.201*** 3.293*** 
   Spain (ref cat)         
Health system  
Interaction 
Spending on health care  0.927*** 0.501 0.945*** 
Spending on insurance 0.930 0.962 0.893 
  Hospital stay   0.922*** 0.979 0.900 
Cut 1  -0.923 -1.078 -0.852 -1.396 
Cut 2  0.327 0.170 0.353 0.113 
Cut 3  1.792 1.653 1.999 0.749 
Cut 4  4.225 4.038 4.431 3.098 
  
Number of observations 4043 3629 3017 612 
  
Pseudo R-square 0.058 0.0554 0.059 0.040 
Note: * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. Standard errors are 
clustered on countries. 
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The key variable of interest ‘rating of choice’ is positive and significant across 
the specifications. Ordered logit odds ratios are reported, implying that when, 
for example, comparing the ‘very bad’ rating of choice to the ‘very good’ 
rating, the odds that the cases are found in a higher (compared to any lower) 
category of satisfaction with the health care system is 6.348 times larger for 
NHS countries. The results are overall consistent with expectations and 
suggest that choice is at least implicitly a component to account for in judging 
the health system, and hence we interpret this evidence as consistent with the 
idea that political incumbents can operate upon to garner support, especially 
when health is regarded as a key public policy responsibility across European 
countries (Eurobarometer, 2009). Needless to say, due to the cross-sectional 
nature of the data we cannot establish causality and hence the coefficients 
should be interpreted as correlations.  
 
As expected, age exhibits a positive effect in explaining satisfaction while the 
results indicate that less educated are more satisfied with the health care 
system. Particularly noteworthy that people in lower income quartiles are 
more satisfied compared to the highest income quartile once we control 
previous interaction with the health care system. When interacting the rating 
of choice and the income quartiles an interesting difference between the NHS 
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and a SHI group becomes evident. Whilst there is a linear relationship across 
income groups between choice demands and satisfaction in SHI countries, in 
NHS system there is a curve-linear relation in the interaction terms. The 3rd 
income quartile is where we find the strongest association consistently with 
the middle class argument for choice. The analysis was repeated on country 
samples which revealed that the positive effect of choice rating on satisfaction 
is significant in all country samples except for Belgium5. Generally people 
with lower incomes rate the health care system higher, except in Sweden 
where income quartiles 1-3 rate the system lower than quartile 4. We find that 
only in Belgium, France, Sweden and the UK income exhibits significant 
differences.  
 
Overall, the World Health Survey data indicates that choice ratings exert a 
positive effect on satisfaction with the health care system. This means that, 
across our sample, choice is a significant component to the views on the 
health care system, regardless of reform trajectory. Next, considering the 
demand for choice in relation to reform trajectory we use regression analysis 
of the Eurobarometer 72.2 data (2009). We focus on ‘demand for choice’ (of 
hospital and doctor) as dependent variables and the key independent variable 
‘self-rated social status’ captures the effect of individuals being in a higher 
                                                        
5 The insignificance of the Belgian sample is not surprising considering the institutional structure 
and reform trajectory. Private options and increased choice were implemented responding to 
demands stemming from the slow inclusion of cutting edge technology and medicines under the 
universal health insurance. 
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socio-economic group. Table 5 separates the two samples, NHS (Italy, UK, 
Spain and Sweden) from SHI countries (France, Belgium, Netherlands and 
Germany). We find that social status has a positive effect on both the 
dependent variables; choice of hospital and choice of GP, significant at the 1% 
level in the NHS group. A one unit increase in the social status rating 
increases the odds of mentioning choice of GP as a criterion for a quality 
health care system (i.e. going from 0-1) by 1.147. Similarly, for choice of 
hospital, the effect size is 1.153. In the SHI country group on the other hand, 
the demand for choice of doctor was negatively related to self-rated social 
status while the demand for choice of hospital was unrelated to social status.  
 
Health system related variables explain some of the variation while socio-
demographic variables are overall insignificant or weakly significantly related 
to the healthy system characteristics. Interestingly, the overall rating of the 
health system, comparing ‘very good’ to ‘fairly good’ is positive in NHS and 
negative in SHI. Lower satisfaction hence leads to more desire for choice, only 
in NHS countries. Gender is generally insignificant, although men in NHS 
countries are more likely to mention choice of doctor. Similarly for age, 
occupational status and marital status little effects are found.  
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Table 5: Demand for choice in NHS versus SHI countries, logistic regressions on 
Eurobarometer 72.2 
  
Choice of doctor 
Choice of 
doctor 
Choice of 
hospital 
Choice of 
hospital 
  
NHS SHI NHS SHI 
Self-rated social status 1.147*** 0.911** 1.153*** 1.028 
Difficulty meeting payments 1.093 0.947 1.375*** 1.037 
Female 
 
0.838* 1.077 1.113 0.930 
Age 
 
1.016 1.014 1.001 1.021* 
Age squared 
 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Overall health 
care quality 
Very good Reference category   
Fairly good 1.251*** 0.841*** 1.060 0.911 
Fairly bad 1.130 0.850 0.935 1.083 
  Very bad 0.881 0.553 0.843 1.145 
Experience with health care system 0.785** 1.012 0.814* 0.994 
Hospital care: 
probability of 
harm 
Very likely Reference category   
Fairly likely 0.881 1.196 0.795 1.142 
Not very likely 0.7045* 1.091 0.742 1.045 
  Not at all likely 0.660 0.968 0.594 1.494* 
Occupational 
status 
Self-employed 1.036 1.102 1.503 0.979 
Managers Reference category   
 
White collar 1.431 0.916 2.156 1.000 
 
Manual workers 1.342* 0.789* 1.533*** 1.073 
 
House persons 1.393 1.227 1.397* 1.285* 
 
Unemployed 1.066 1.180 1.670 1.206 
 
Retired 1.243 1.112 1.581* 1.003 
 
Students 1.118 0.565** 2.425*** 0.797 
Marital status Married Reference category   
 
Cohabitating 0.762 0.953 0.971 0.904 
 
Single 0.981 1.048 0.952 1.000 
 
Divorced or 
separated 1.020 0.927 0.999 0.926 
 
Widow 1.358* 0.859 0.762 1.179 
 Other 1.111 1.203 0.624 0.806 
High education (yes) 0.920 1.024 0.893 0.874 
Access to IT 
 
0.791** 1.088 1.169 0.901 
Owns home (yes) 0.993 1.168* 1.082 1.124 
Area type Large town 1.314** 1.324*** 0.931 1.149 
 
Mid-sized town 1.171 1.059 0.936 0.875 
 Rural Reference category   
Italy       1.210   0.820   
Spain 
 
2.128*** 
 
0.708** 
 Sweden 
 
1.370** 
 
0.590*** 
 UK  Reference category    
France 
  
0.616*** 
 
0.706*** 
Germany 
  
0.714*** 
 
0.427*** 
Netherlands 
  
0.546*** 
 
0.510*** 
Belgium 
 
Reference category   
Number of observations 3760 4359 3760 4359 
R-square   0.0171 0.0308 0.0317 0.0216 
Note: * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. Standard errors are 
clustered on countries. 
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5. Discussion 
 
This paper has examined the wider motivations for provider choice in 
European health systems. It has done so by providing an empirical analysis of 
institutional trajectories and survey data evidence. Evidence reveals a strong 
link between availability of choice and individual satisfaction with the health 
care system. The link was stronger among middle range income groups in tax 
funded (NHS) countries. The link between the middle class and choice in the 
health system was further supported by the evidence of middle class 
preferences for choice from the Eurobarometer survey (2009). This indicated 
that in NHS countries the middle class view choice as an important part of a 
quality health care system, in contrast to SHI systems where there is a non-
existent or in fact negative social gradient to the demand for choice.  
 
In explaining such results one can be argue that preference for choice tend to 
be more extreme where the institutional default offers less choice, namely in 
tax systems and where, individuals can opt out to the private sector if the 
system fails to offer the requested choice. The latter is especially the case of 
the middle class (Costa-Font and Jofre-Bonet, 2008). In contrast in SHI 
countries; provider choice is part of the insurance.  
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As argued initially, the ‘choice agenda’ tends to incorporate some degree of 
competition, with potentially diverging drivers and motivations. While 
provider competition is more likely to be driven by cost-containment, in 
contrast provider choice (between public providers, or choice of treatment), is 
more plausibly driven by middle class demand as a precondition for reform 
(Le Grand and Bartlett 1993). Choice reforms may bypass existing health 
system shortcomings, such as excessive waiting times, which can nurture a 
harsh critique towards the health care system in general. Indeed, furthering 
choice may generate increased public support for state provided health care 
and increase individuals’ trust in, and continued use of, public health care. 
Similarly, the choice agenda can be argued to act as a reform precondition by 
providing the opportunities for service legitimisation (Le Grand 2007).  
 
Other literatures have dealt with the process of policy makers being 
influenced, actively or passively, by particular constituencies (Finseraas and 
Vernby 2011), and proceed under the hypothesis of interlinked preferences 
and policy outcomes in the case of consumer choice reform. Nevertheless, no 
attempt is here made to disentangle the dynamics with which the preferences 
of the well-off translate into policy change.  Needless to say, we are not 
arguing there is evidence of a sort of public demonstration of middle class 
people taking to the streets (“What do we want? Choice! When do we want it? 
Now!”). Instead, in the context of political competition where the 
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improvement of the NHS is perceived as a political asset, we argue that 
expanding choice increases the chance of obtaining the support of the middle 
class and hence for political incumbents to claim credit for health policy 
reform. The assumption here is that public opinion matters for elected 
politicians’ behaviour (Page and Shapiro 1983). Arguably, this is especially 
the case of tax based system where systems are politically managed.   
 
Alternative explanations include Anell (2005) who argues that the reason for 
the introduction of choice was political and ideological rather than a response 
to a clear demand from patients and citizens more broadly. Yet, other 
evidence suggests that the Swedish choice reforms where intended to 
decrease waiting times by integrating , private GP’s in the public network  
(Bergmark 2008). Similarly in the UK, where choice reforms  aimed at 
incentivise the middle class to keep using  the NHS rather than going private 
(Greener 2003). 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has sought to explore of the claim that alternative political 
economy explanations underpin the ‘choice agenda’ in European health care 
systems beyond the most commonly cited driver and motivation, namely cost-
containing and micro-efficiency. We focus on provider choice in National 
Health Service (NHS) countries and we provide empirical evidence 
suggestive of ‘choice reforms’ are consistent with the public need of 
responsiveness, and more specifically to the demands of the middle classes in 
NHS countries, consistently with Le Grand, (2007) discussion of choice as a 
middle class obsession. Importantly, we show that choice on its own has been 
shown not to be conducive to cost-containment unless coupled with provider 
competition which has lately been a reform with the purpose of curbing rising 
expenditures through efficiency improvements.   
 
Our evidence is consistent with the argument that middle class demands for 
health care choice are a key driving force across the models of care. The role 
of choice demands is not largely noticeable in Italy and Spain given that 
middle class find themselves purchasing complementary private health 
insurance instead. Further research should follow up the development of 
datasets that allow identifying the longer term effects of choice reforms and 
support from different socio-economic groups.  
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